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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
SUGGESTED LIMITATIONS OF THE PUBLIC POLICY
DOCTRINE
By CHARLES B. NUTTING*
ECENT activity among writers in the field of the conflict of
laws has revealed an awakened interest in the ever-vexing
problem of determining the law applicable to situations in which
the law of the forum differs from that of some other jurisdiction
which may govern.' Apparently proceeding on the assumption
that a court in such case is at liberty to select the law to be applied,
varying suggestions have been made as to the criterion to be
adopted. If the vested rights theory of conflicts is followed, much
of this discussion becomes irrelevant, since under that theory there
is, strictly speaking, no "choice" of law, one law and one alone
being properly applicable in every case.- Whether this or some
other theory embodies the true explanation of conflicts cases, we
may leave to those who hurl thunderbolts about Olympus.' The
writer, being sympathetically inclined toward the high church
party in these matters, favors it for reasons which will appear
hereafter. But at any rate, the following discussion is confined for
the most part to a situation in which, even under the vested rights
theory, there has been thought to be a legitimate ground for refus-
ing to recognize rights acquired in a state other than the forun.
"'No action call be maintained upon a cause of action created in
another state, the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong
public policy of the forum." Thus reads the Restatement, the
word "strong" having been interpolated in the last proposed final
draft emanating from the American Law Institute and retained
in the Restatement as finally published. 4 The scope of this section,
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law,
Lincoln, Nebraska.
'Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, (1933) 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 173; Heilman, Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in the Con-
flict of Laws, (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 1082; note (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 508;
case (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 526.
2Beale, Conflict of Laws 2.
3Beale, Conflict of Laws 105; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy
and the Conflict of Laws, (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 736; Cook, The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 457.
4American Law Institute Restatement. Conflict of Laws, Proposed Final
Draft No. 4, sec. 620; American Law Institute, Restatement of Conflict of
Laws. sec. 612.
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we read further, is strictly limited and applies only to those causes
of action so contrary to public policy that the forum will withhold
the use of its courts altogether in enforcing them. Immediately
numerous questions come to mind. Is this actually a statement of
existing law? What is public policy? How does a strong public
policy differ from any other kind? Is it desirable that the applica-
tion of the rule be strictly limited? If so, how is it to be done?
And, perhaps the fundamental query, should we have a rule of
this kind at all?
I suppose it is fair to say that section 612 is not, was not
intended to be, and could not in any event be a statement of exist-
ing law in the sense that it represents approximate unanimity of
judicial opinion. Recent egregious examples leave some doubt as
to whether it even represents the present tendency of the cases,'
though there are instances to be found which might support the
assertion.6 At any rate, it seems clear that the decisions on this
subject are in such utter confusion that an attempt to "restate"
them in the form of a definite rule leaves many of them absent and
unaccounted for.7 The rule as stated may be implicit in the vested
rights theory, which has been supported by the reporter of this
subject, and under which the whole doctrine of public policy must
be something of an anomaly.s Certainly it is true that many of
the cases most open to criticism have ostensibly been based on the
theory of comity, which, in spite of the fact that it has been
announced as thoroughly exploded on numerous occasions, seems
cheerfully impervious to bombardment.'
5See Farmers and Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, (1933) 216 Iowa
988, 250 N. W. 214; Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., (1934)
263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456; Personal Finance Co. of Council Bluffs v.
Giliorsky Fruit Co., (Neb. 1934) 255 N. W. 558.
6An outstanding example, curiously enough, is from the jurisdiction
which later decided the Vladikavkazsky Case. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
(1918) 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198. See, Slattery v. Hartford Trust Co.,
(1932) 115 Conn. 163, 161 At. 79.7See infra pp. 199-200.
sBeale, Conflict of Laws 105.
9Though it may be true that the cases may be explained on some other
basis, some of our courts are still talking about comity in a way which
would lead us to think that they regard it as the foundation of all con-
flicts rules. See, Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Anderson, (1933) 216
Iowa 988, 996, 997, 250 N. W. 214, 218; Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New
York Trust Co., (1934) 263 N. Y. 369, 378, 189 N. F. 456, 460. Cf. the
language of White, C. J., in Bond v. Hume, (1917) 243 U. S. 15, 21, 37
Sup. Ct. 366, 61 L. Ed. 565. ".... it is elementary that the right to enforce
a foreign contract in another foreign country could alone rest upon the
general principles of comity."
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But whatever may be the true explanation of the rule as
adopted, it must be conceded that some limitation of its scope
must be imposed if the security of interstate transactions is to be
protected. If the courts are left free to refuse recognition to foreign
rights of action by reverting to an entirely unlimited conception
of public policy, their enforcement must necessarily be uncertain
and capricious. That being so, the inquiry must resolve itself into
a consideration of the best means of delimiting the field in which
public policy may operate. At the outset the desirability of a strict
and rigid as opposed to a broad and flexible definition becomes
material. There has been much inveighing against the mechanical
application of conflicts rules in some quarters. Instead of requir-
ing the selection and application of the proper rule of law, it has
been urged that the judges be given something relatively easy to
do, such as insuring just results in individual cases,' 0 or attaining
the most desirable economic consequences in transactions." The
search for a delusive certainty to be attained by the application of
fixed rules has been thought undesirable and the gradual develop-
ment of standards to be a possible solution. Adherents to this view
would apply it not primarily to the public policy situation but to
any case in which the court was called upon to select the law to
be applied to a given set of facts. It seems necessarily to be based
on the idea that there is no obligation on the court of any state
(always saving the full faith and credit clause) to recognize the
law of another jurisdiction, the only question being as to whether
or not recognition is expedient from the standpoint of judicial
administration.' 2 However, it has been suggested that the invoca-
tion of public policy may constitute a device for the prevention of
a too rigid adherence to the law generally deemed applicable to
a given case.' 3 Without reference to the broader question of the
"choice" of law, it would seem evident that to allow the courts
free reign in refusing to give effect to transactions arising in a
foreign state because of a public policy against "injustice" or some
equally vague concept would be to inject an entirely needless ele-
ment of uncertainty into the situation. There seems to be no dispo-
lOCavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, (1933) 47 Harv.
L. Rev. 173, 193.
"Heilman, Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of
Laws, (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 1082, 1108.
12 Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws,
(1924) 33 Yale L. J. 736, 748.
13Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, (1933) 47 Harv.
L. Rev. 173, 183, 201.
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sition to question the danger of using public policy as a substitute
for analysis,' " and even though the courts may be justified in
choosing the law to be applied on broader grounds, this does not
do away with the necessity for restricting the use of public policy
to dearly defined situations. Thus it appears evident that a strict
limitation of the doctrine is advisable no matter what may be the
fundamental theory from which the problem is approached. But
this probably gratuitous defense of the Restatement leaves un-
solved the questions, what is public policy and what a strict limi-
tation of the doctrine.
Many recent articles in this field conclude with an earnest
exhortation to look at cases instead of theories; to find out what
courts actually do as opposed to what they ought to do in the
opinion of scholars. A prayerful examination of the cases in an
attempt to learn what public policy is has caused this investigator
to retire baffled, which seems a not unusual result.1" It has been
discovered, for example, that a judicial rule holding a provision
limiting the liability of shareholders in a joint stock association
ineffective, 6 a decree of a foreign government nationalizing rail-
road property17 and a provision exempting a carrier from liability
for negligence 8 have all been held contrary to public policy and
invalid within the last four years. In the nationalization situation
the English court has reached an opposite result.1" The gaming
cases are in confusion,2 0 and conflicting views as to the general
14"Its very facility is its most unfortunate trait. In its somewhat
cavalier dismissal of a foreign law, it dispenses with the necessity for close
analysis, for an affirmative appraisal of the situation upon which judgment
must be passed." Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, (1933)
47 Harv. L. Rev. 173, 184.
15 "On the Continent efforts have been made to systematize the doctrine
of public policy, but the variety of circumstances which may evoke its use
is such that generality in the principle involved has been inescapable."
Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, (1933) 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 173, 184.
"In England and the United States ... no attempt has been made ...
to reduce the cases falling wiAthin the doctrine to any system or order."
Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, (1924)
33 Yale L. J. 736, 747.
16 Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Anderson, (1933) 216 Iowa 988,
250 N. W. 214.
'
7 Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., (1934) 263 N. Y.
369, 189 N. E. 456.
SF. A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., (1930) 254 N. Y.
407, 173 N. E. 564.
19Aksionairnoye Obschestuo A. M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co.,
[1921] 3 K. B. 532, 90 L. J. K. B. 1202.
20Gooch v. Faucett, (1898) 122 N. C. 270, 29 S. E. 362; Flagg v.
Baldwin, (1884) 38 N. J. Eq. 219; Saxby v. Fulton L. R., [1909] 2 K. B.
208, 78 L. 3. K. B. 781.
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scope of the doctrine are found within the same jurisdiction.2 1
Other examples might be cited, but multiplication of instances
seems useless. Nor are we aided by the definitions appearing in
the cases. We may be comparatively certain that reference to
public policy as "our own sense of justice and equity" is too
broad2 2 and that it will not do to say that a state may refuse recog-
nition to a foreign law deemed "impolitic or unjust, of bad morals
or injurious to the rights and interests of its citizens .. ."13 We
may agree that the courts "do not close their doors unless help
would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some preva-
lent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal."2 4 But the application of such a standard presents
grave difficulties and might easily result in practice in that very
refusal to recognize a foreign right because of "the individual
notion of expediency or fairness" which Mr. Justice Cardozo
attacked in the case in question.
The conclusion must be, then, that a clearly developed and
defined concept of public policy cannot be found in the cases.
Though we probably have not made and never shall attempt a
factual study of the type often advocated, we do know enough
to say with considerable confidence that an investigation to deter-
mine when the courts will apply the doctrine of public policy to
deny the recognition of a foreign right would result in the con-
clusion, "you never can tell." The futility of elaborate attempts
at fact finding, which seem to have become popular due to a pos-
sibly erroneous assumption that a method which has proved fruit-
ful in the physical sciences must operate successfully in law," is
apparent at least as far as this inquiry is concerned. It therefore
becomes necessary, if we are to bring order out of the present
chaos, to resort to some other expedient.
If the courts are to find their way out of the maze unaided, it
21Compare Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N. Y. 99, 120
N. E. 198 with Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., (1934) 263
N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 and F. A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry.,
(1930) 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564. For an extensive citation and
review of the cases see note, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 508. The writer de-
sires to acknowledge his especial indebtedness to the author of this note,
which has been of great aid in the search for material.22Vladikavkazsky Ry. -Co. v. New York Trust Co., (1934) 263 N. Y.
369, 378, 189 N. E. 456, 460.23Gooch v. Faucett, (1898) 122 N. C. 270, 272, 29 S. E. 362, 363.24Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E.
198, 202.
25Cf. Hutchins, Autobiography of an Ex Law Student, (1934) 7 Am.
L. School Rev. 1051.
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would appear that adherence to the vested rights theory is most
likely to result in a limitation of the public policy doctrine. A court
which bases its decisions on the view that an obligation exists to
give effect to rights which are created and have become vested
under the law of another jurisdiction is much less likely to refuse
recognition than one which regards the problem entirely as a ques-
tion of expediency. This is indicated by the marked correlation
between adherence, or at least lip service, to the theory of comity
and broad interpretations of the scope of public policy which has
already been noted.2 6 Under the vested rights theory the denial
of recognition is clearly exceptional and can be justified only in
extreme circumstances. Thus it would seem that as a missionary
project, the rule as laid down in the Restatement is cotmnendable.
As long as it may be supported by respectable judicial authority,
as seems evident,27 there is little merit in the charge that it is too
theoretical. With the existing confusion among the authorities
making accurate generalization impossible, more theory and less
attention to cases rather than the opposite would appear advisable.
But is not the present state of authority indicative of a more
fundamental difficulty than that which might be caused by a con-
flict of theories? Does it not result from an attempt on the part
of the courts to undertake a function which is legislative rather
than judicial? It has been said times without number in other
connections that the proper body for the determination of policy
is the legislature rather than the court,28 and there seems to be no
2 Supra, n. 9.
27Though it has been said with probable accuracy that "the 'vested
rights' doctrine has not received much conscious application," note, (1933)
33 Col. L. Rev. 508, 517, Professor Beale has asserted that since the time
of Story it has been the accepted theory in English and American courts.
Beale, Conflict of Laws 105. In the Loucks Case (1918) 224 N. Y. 99,
120 N. E. 198, Cardozo, J., uses the term and apparently adopts the theory.
while in Chubbuck v. Holloway, (1931) 182 Minn. 225, 228, 234 N. W.
314, 316 the lahguage of the court indicates adherence to the doctrine.
2SThe reference, of course, is to cases in which the constitutionality
of a statute has been attacked. It seems unnecessary to cite examples.
See, however, McLean v. Arkansas, (1908) 211 U. S. 539, 547, 29 Sup.
Ct. 206, 208, 53 L. Ed. 315; Tanner v. Little, (1915) 240 1U. S. 369. 385,
36 Sup. Ct. 379, 384, 60 L. Ed. 691. The opinions cited are by Justices
Day and McKenna, respectively. See, passim, Powell, The Supreme Court
and State Police Power, 1922-1930 (1931) 17 Va. L. Rev. 529, 653. 765.
In a sense this statement may be merely a form of words, since the power
of a court to declare a statute unconstitutional renders it the final arbiter,
and it cannot be denied that the courts have frequently injected their own
views of policy into a constitutional controversy. Nevertheless, as Profes-
sor Powell points out, (529) "They [the judges] undoubtedly sustain
legislation that they think silly or pernicious." And the results when
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reason why the same view should not obtain here. Whether recog-
nition of a right acquired abroad should be granted or withheld
is essentially a political question dependent on factors which can-
not be accurately ascertained by the use of judicial machinery. To
allow the courts to decide it is to open the door to variable indi-
vidual conceptions of policy on the one hand and a blind adherence
to precedent on the other, as may be abundantly demonstrated.21'
While it is undoubtedly true that the courts have not heretofore
confined themselves to the consideration of legislative definitions
of public policy, there has been on the part of some judges a
recognition of the fact that they are treading on dangerous ground.
Thus it was said by Harrison, J., in Smith v. San Francisco &
Northern Pacific Ry.,30
"Public policy is a term of vague and uncertain meaning, which
it pertains to the law making power to define, and courts are apt
to encroach upon the domain of that branch of the government if
they characterize a transaction as invalid because it is contrary to
public policy, unless the transaction contravenes some positive
statute or some well established rule of law."
Mr. Justice Cardozo, while on the New York court, though he
recognized the existence of a "non-legislative" public policy, used
language in the Loucks Case indicating the much broader scope
of the doctrine when based on legislative as distinct from judicial
pronouncement.3 1 That the legislature is a better instrument for
the determination of policy than the courts has been recognized,,-
the contrary has been the case must be regarded as unfortunate. (788)
See infra n. 29.29Where the courts have attempted to embody their own views as to
social justice in their decisions, the result has frequently if not usually been
unfortunate. Perhaps the outstanding examples may be found in the cases
involving social legislation in the last century. Dean Pound has attributed
the decisions in these cases, among other things, to an individualist con-
ception of justice and the operation of a "mechanical jurisprudence." Pound,
Liberty of Contract, (1909) 18 Yale L. J. 454, 457. See, Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, (1908) 8 Col. L. Rev. 605; Pound, Common Law and Legis-
lation, (1908) 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 384. Professor C. R. Henderson in(1906) 11 Am. J. of Soc. 847 speaks of "the humiliating and discouraging
decisions of some courts which set aside laws to meet contemporary con-
ditions by appeals to precedents drawn from ancient history." This is
probably fairly indicative of the opinions of workers in the other social
sciences.
30(1897) 115 Cal. 584, 600, 47 Pac. 582, 587. This case did not
involve a conflicts point but has reference to the public policy doctrine in
general.
31(1918) 224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 198, 202. "The sovereign in
its discretion may refuse its aid to the foreign right. From this it has
been an easy step to the conclusion that a like freedom of choice has been
confided to the courts. But this, of course, is a false view."32McNamara v. Gargett, (1888) 68 Mich. 454, 460, 36 N. W. 218, 221:
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and its function as the primary determinative source has been
generally conceded.13 It is, of course, clear that, in the absence of
constitutional limitations, the legislature may declare the public
policy and the court vill bow to its decision.34 Thus it would
seem that although no court, so far as I am aware, has gone to the
length of asserting that under present conditions the legislature
is the only body able to declare the policy of the state, there has
been considerable reluctance in some quarters in extending the
power of the judiciary in this field. The feeling, frequently articu-
late, that the court is a tool ill adapted to such determination is
not to be denied. Strong as this belief may be when local trais-
actions are concerned, it must become even more persuasive when
the scope of the doctrine affects interstate and foreign business.
For here, not only the policy of a state with reference to specific
transactions is concerned, but also delicate and complicated ques-
tions involving the relationship of states and nations and the free
flow of commerce.
Thus, strict limitation of the scope of the public policy doc-
trine, already seen to be essential, should, it is felt, be attained by
recognizing and giving effect to the proposition that declarations
of policy should be confined to legislative enactment and that the
courts should never refuse to give effect to rights acquired abroad
unless a statute making such a course imperative exists in the
forum.3 5 Mere silence3 6 or differences in statutes' should not be
"Some of the courts, speaking upon this subject, have said that the im-
mediate representatives of the people in legislature assembled would seem
to be the fairest exponents of what public policy requires, as being most
familiar with the habits and fashions of the day, and with the actual con-
dition of commerce and trade, their consequent wants and weaknesses; that
legislation is least objectionable, because it undertakes prospectively, as a
guide in future negotiations, and does not, like a judgment of a court, annul a
contract already concluded."
33United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, (1896) 166 U. S. 290,
340, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 41 L. Ed. 1007: "The public policy of the government
is to be found in its statutes, and when they have not directly spoken, then
in the decisions of the courts and the constant practice of government offi-
cials; but when the law making power speaks upon a particular subject,
over which it has constitutional power to legislate, public policy in such a
case is what the statute enacts." See, Aksionairnoye Obschesuo A. M.
Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K. B. 532, 559, 90 L. J. K. B.
1202; Henni v. Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, (1901) 61 Neb. 744, 86 N. W.
475.
34Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Thompson, (1906) 100 Tex. 185, 189, 97 S. W.
459, 460; Henning v. Hill, (1923) 80 Ind. App. 363, 367, 141 N. E. 66, 67;
In re Dennis Estate, (1925) 98 Vt. 424, 426, 129 Atl. 166, 167. See Good-
rich, Conflict of Laws 216.
35Situations of the type covered by sections 608-611 of the Restate-
ment are not included in this discussion.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
enough. It should fairly appear to be the legislative intention to
refuse recognition to rights wherever acquired. It will be observed
that such a course would result in the immediate elimination of
groups of cases which have heretofore complicated the situation.
First would be those in which the court has imposed its ideas of
policy and morality on a transaction without recourse to statutes. "8
Then would come the cases in which the silence of the legislature
or differences in the statutes have been thought to indicate a policy
favoring non-recognition.39 With these categories eliminated, the
scope of the doctrine would be considerably restricted. That such
a result could be obtained by action of the courts themselves seems
too much to hope. However, a general legislative definition of
policy embodying these views might easily be framed and, as has
been seen, would undoubtedly be adopted by the courts.
40
However, it may be objected that this course would open the
way to unbridled activity on the part of the legislature and that
36See, Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N. Y. 99, 110, 120
N. E. 198, 201; Powell v. Great Northern Ry., (1907) 102 Minn. 448, 453.
113 N. W. 1017, 1018.
3
7See, Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N. Y. 99, 110, 120
N. E. 198, 201; Parker-Harris Co. v. Stephens, (1920) 205 Mo. App.
373, 378, 224 S. W. 1036, 1038; Miller v. Tennis, (1929) 140 Okla. 185,
190, 282 Pac. 345, 350; Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., (1883) 31
Minn. 11, 16 N. W. 413; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 199.
3SSuch cases apparently still exist, though not in great numbers. See
Farmers and Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, (1933) 216 Iowa 988, 250
N. W. 214; Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., (1934) 263
N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456. Possibly the latter case might be explained on
the ground that the decree of the Soviet government was violative of our
public policy as expressed in the due process clause.39See, In re Dennis Estate, (1925) 98 Vt. 424, 129 Atl. 166; Texas
and P. Ry. v. Richards, (1887) 68 Tex. 375, 4 S. W. 627.
4 0 It would seem that this would be an instance in which the Restate-
ment might profitably be given legislative sanction. Cf. Franklin, The
Historic Function of the American Law Institute, (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev.
1367. After stating the rule as laid down in section 612, the following, or
something similar might be added:
"The enforcement of such a right shall be deemed contrary to the
public policy of this state only when specifically forbidden by its laws or
constitution."
It seems clear that the public policy of the state may be declared by
the constitution and that such a declaration would be controlling. See,
People v. Emmerson, (1922) 302 Il. 300, 134 N. E. 707; Wall v. Pfan-
schmidt, (1914) 265 I11. 180, 106 N. E. 785. The statutes declaring the
public policy in specific instances should apparently operate to deny juris-
diction to the courts to enforce the claim in question. See, Anglo-American
Prov. Co. v. Davis Prov. Co., (1903) 191 U. S. 373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92, 48 L.
Ed. 225; Chambers v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., (1907) 207 U. S. 142, 28 Sup.
Ct. 34, 52 L. Ed. 143; Fauntleroy v. Lure, (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup.
Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039. How far the distinction indicated in these cases
would be considered applicable today is hightly conjectural.
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the existing confusion would thus be increased rather than dimin-
ished. In answer it may be said that, so far as this country is
concerned, constitutional barriers would prevent undue interference
with foreign-acquired rights. The exact effect of the full faith
and credit clause upon the public policy doctrine has not as yet
been determined. It has been argued with much force that it
should operate to prevent the refusal to enforce foreign rights on
the ground of public policy in all cases.4" On the other hand, it
has been broadly asserted that ". . . the clause has not abolished
the general principle of the dominance of local policy over rules
of comity."4 2 The decisions of the United States Supreme Court
indicate, though vaguely, that the truth lies somewhere between
these extremes. Professor Dodd, writing in 1926, was able to con-
clude only that the court had partially adopted the view that the
full faith and credit clause prevents a denial of foreign-acquired
rights on the ground of public policy." Recent cases have not
tended to clarify the issue. It seems reasonably clear, however,
that the Supreme Court has not constituted itself an arbiter in a:l
conflicts cases and that there is a field, albeit of indeterminate
boundaries, where the public policy of the state may hold sway.'"
However, there are instances in which the court apparently has
used the clause in such a manner as to require the recognition of
a foreign-acquired right regardless of the policy of the forum."3
4 1Comment, (1918) 13 Ill. L. Rev. 43. See, Beach, Uniform Interstate
Enforcement of Vested Rights, (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 656.
4 2Corwin, The Full Faith and Credit Clause, (1933) 81 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 371, 374. Professor Corwin, of course, recognizes the fact that in
some situations the court has overthrown the local rule. For another state-
ment regarding the public policy doctrine as a limitation on the full faith
and credit clause, see, note, (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 648.
4 3Dodd, Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in
the Field of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533.
44Kryger v. Wilson, (1916) 242 U. S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed.
229; Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, (1918) 245 U. S. 412, 38 Sup. Ct. 147,
62 L. Ed. 368. In other cases the refusal of the forum to recognize a
foreign right has been upheld when attacked under the commerce, due
process, and privileges and immunities clauses. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ry.
v. Hughes, (1903) 191 U. S. 477, 24 Sup. Ct. 132, 48 L. Ed. 268.
45 The cases in which this has been true as far as the result is concerned
are not entirely satisfactory when the basis of the decision is sought. Thus,
it has been denied in the instance that the forum could have any public
policy affecting the transaction, though it was recognized that in a proper
case public policy might be operative. Converse -v. Hamilton, (1912) 224
U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749. Again, the statute of the forum
has been said not to express a public policy against the recognition of the
particular right involved. Bond v. Hume, (1917) 243 U. S. 15, 37 Sup.
Ct. 366, 61 L. Ed. 565. In still other cases an improper application of
conflicts principles has been held to constitute a denial of full faith and
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Thus it would seem that the solution of the problem is dependent
on the conceptions of the Supreme Court regarding the principles
of the conflict of laws which are to be applied in a given situation,
since apparently the court may extend its application of the full
faith and credit clause to secure uniformity when it appears neces-
sary.
The non-applicability of the clause in certain situations, such
as the enforcement of penal laws and decrees affecting foreign
land, has been conclusively determined,4" but the matter under
discussion cannot be said to belong to any of these categories. It
has been suggested that public policy may control when the inter-
est of the forum in the transaction is substantial and may be dis-
regarded when that interest is slight.4  The cases also indicate the
possibility of a differentiation on the basis of the desirability of
uniformity in particular instances. When because of the number
and importance of interstate aspects involved a uniform rule is
particularly desirable, the court will be likely to impose it by means
of the full faith and credit clause. This has been true in the past
with reference to insurance cases.48 Recently we have witnessed
credit without discussion of the existence or possible effect of the public
policy of the forum. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green,
(1915) 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089; Modern Woodnen
of America v. Mixer, (1925) 267 U. S. 544, 45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783.
These last cases can scarcely be said to affect the problem, since if the
Supreme Court views the public policy doctrine as a principle of the conflict
of laws, as it apparently does, it is one of the things which may be con-
sidered by the court as controlling in a proper case, and the fact that it was
not discussed in these cases throws no light on the views of the court as
to its proper scope. The two most recent cases in which it has been
thought that the court has extended the scope of the full faith and credit
clause and limited the application of the public policy doctrine likewise fail
to indicate anything in the nature of a general rule, though they may show
a disposition on the part of the court to restrict the doctrine. See, Brad-
ford Electric Co. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76
L. Ed. 1026; Yarborough v. Yarborough, (1933) 290 U. S. 202, 54 Sup.
Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269. A refusal to recognize a foreign-acquired right may
constitute a denial of due process. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, (1930) 281
U. S. 397, 50 Sup. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926. See the discussion infra, n. 53.
46See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Yarborough v.
Yarborough, (1933) 290 U. S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269; case,
(1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 164.
47Dodd, Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the
Field of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 559. A recent
case which may be cited in support of this view is Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, (1933) 290 U. S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269, where the
possible impairment of an existing status was considered by the majority
to be a denial of full faith and credit. The case is noted in (1934) 34
Col. L. Rev. 164; (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 648; (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 712;(1934) 18 MINNESorA LAw RMEW 593-594.
48See, Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, (1915) 237
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an apparent extension of the rule to the field of workmen's com-
pensation. 49 And it may be that the future will disclose other
areas in which intervention in this manner is necessary or desirable.
But an entirely ad hoc definition of public policy can scarcely
be said to satisfy the needs of the situation, though it is inevitable
that an attempt to confine the doctrine within absolutely fixed
limits will fail. If all but statutory declarations of policy be eliini-
nated, however, it seems possible to employ a technique of decision
with which we have already become familiar and which may reduce
the cases to some semblance of order. It is suggested that a statute
ddnying recognition to a foreign-acquired right on the ground of
public policy is essentially a police regulation and must be scruti-
nized by the court in the same way as other legislation of a like
character. The marked similarity between definitions of public
policy found in the cases and standard texts and those of the
police power taken from sources of the same kind indicates that
an identical basis underlies both. 0 Though the cases infrequently
refer to legislation of the sort with which we are concerned as
police regulations, such language is not entirely absent from the
decisions, 5 and it seems clear from other opinions that the court
is thinking in terms of the police power although it does not spe-
cifically say so.
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If this suggestion is sound, it would appear that cases arising
under the full faith and credit clause should be decided in much
the same way as those in which a state statute comes into conflict
with the commerce or due process5" clauses of the federal consti-
U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed. 1089; Modern Woodmen of America
v. Mixer, (1925) 267 U. S. 544, 45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783; note,(1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 291.49Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct.
571, 76 L. Ed. 1026. Note, (1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 291.
5°See, Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 216; Gooch v. Faucett, (1898) 122
N. C. 270, 29 S. E. 362; Flagg v. Baldwin, (1884) 38 N. J. Eq. 219; Bond
v. Hume, (1917) 243 ,U. S. 15, 37 Sup. Ct. 366, 61 L. Ed. 565; Powell v.
Great Northern Ry., (1907) 102 Minn. 448, 113 N. W. 1017. Cf. the
definitions of the police power given in 12 C. J. 94 n. 89a.51See the dissenting opinion of White, C. J. in Fauntleroy v. Lum.
(1908) 210 U. S. 320, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039; Commonwealth Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Hayden, (1900) 60 Neb. 636, 638, 83 N. W. 922, 923.
5
2 See Powell v. Great Northern Ry., (1907) 102 Minn. 448, 113 N. W.
1017; Bond v. Hume, (1917) 243 U. S. 15, 37 Sup. Ct. 366. 61 L. Ed.
565; F. A. Straus Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., (1930) 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E.
564; Gooch v. Faucett, (1898) 122 N. C. 270, 29 S. E. 362; Pennsylvania
Ry. v. Hughes, (1903) 191 U. S. 477, 24 Sup. Ct. 132, 48 L. Ed. 268.
53The relationship of the due process clause to state decisions in the
field of conflicts is in itself a problem worthy of extended consideration.
It seems clear that the court may make use of the clause in order to
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tution. There seems to be good ground to believe that the reasons
underlying the adoption of the full faith and credit and commerce
clauses by the framers of the constitution were much the same."
The same considerations influencing decisions in the field of inter-
state commerce would thus apply to a very large extent to cases
arising under the other clause, i. e., the necessity of encouraging
the free operation of interstate transactions and at the same time
allowing the respective states a reasonable latitude in the regula-
tion of their internal affairs?5 Unless a state statute declarative of
local policy can be said to invade a field in which uniformity is of
sufficient importance to necessitate the intervention of the United
States Supreme Court, it should not be held unconstitutional under
the full faith and credit clause. As was said by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in Bradford Electric Company v. Clapper,""
"It is true that the full faith and credit clause does not require
the enforcement of every right conferred by a statute of another
state. There is room for some play of conflicting policies."
It is believed that this view presents a rationale of all the decisions
to date with the possible exception of the Yarborough Case.5 7 In
the insurance cases"8 the result was obviously dictated by the neces-
sity of uniform and certain rules governing the conduct of a busi-
ness of national scope. The recent extension of the court's inter-
require the recognition of a foreign right. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., (1934) 292 U. S. 143, 54 Sup. Ct. 634, 78
L. Ed. 1178. But between the decision in this case and that of Kryger v.
Wilson, (1916) 242 U. S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. 229, is a large field
in which the operation of the clause is uncertain. Mr. Ross is apparently
of the opinion that the selection of the law applicable to conflicts cases
is, and ought to be, generally speaking, a federal question. Ross, Has the
Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, (1931) 15
MINNESOTA LAW REViEW 161. But this, of course, does not solve tie
question of the lines the court will draw. The cases involving a conflict
between public policy and due process seem to indicate much the same
thing as those arising under the full faith and credit clause, i.e., scope is
allowed for the exercise of the state police power, but the court will in-
tervene to prevent the state from denying foreign rights with reference to
matters in which it has no interest or which are of such great national
importance that uniform rules are necessary. See pp. 207-209.
54That is, a desire to make possible uniform rules so that free inter-
course between the states might be easily attained. See, The Federalist,
Numbers 11, 22; 3 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 179.
55For an account of the way in which the Supreme Court has handled
the situation with reference to the commerce clause, see, among other
valuable articles by the same author, Thomas Reed Powell, Supreme
Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and State Police Power, (1921)
21 Col. L. Rev. 737; (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 28.56(1932) 286 U. S. 145, 160, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76 L. Ed. 1026.
57Yarborough v. Yarborough, (1933) 290 U. S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181,
78 L. Ed. 269.
5S8Supra n. 48.
LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE
pretation of the full faith and credit clause to a case involving
workmen's compensation was rendered desirable by the multitude
of cases having to do with the possible operation of two or more
state rules.59 Conversely, where questions of merely local law
without nationally important implications have been involved, the
court has declined to intervene."0 As to the Yarborough Case, the
bearing of the decision on the question at hand is extremely doubt-
ful. The suggestion has been made that the decision of the major-
ity might be construed to limit the refusal of the forum to recog-
nize a foreign-acquired right to cases in which there is no juris-
diction, or that it might be explained on the basis that the interest
of the forum in the maintenance of the plaintiff was sufficiently
safeguarded by other existing sanctions against nonsupport."
Possibly it may be said that the interest of the forum was so slight
that it could not be said to have a "public policy" in regard to the
situation, which would place the case on the same footing as Cos-
verse v. Hamilton.6 2 At any rate, the case can scarcely be said
to raise the issue of the proper scope of public policy when con-
sidered in the light of the full faith and credit clause since it
involves primarily the application of another conflicts principle-
the recognition to be accorded a status.
From the foregoing discussion it appears that although there
is a place for the public policy doctrine in safeguarding the domes-
tic interests of the state from foreign encroachment, the declara-
tion of policy is a matter which should be entrusted to the legis-
lature rather than the courts; that a limitation of the doctrine to
legislative enactments would considerably reduce the existing con-
fusion in the decisions; and that under the full faith and credit
clause the court, by applying the test of the power of the legis-
lature to enact police regulations, would be able to protect the
national interest and at the same time give the state sufficient lati-
tude in the conduct of its domestic affairs.63
59Supra n. 49. See, note, (1934) 12 Neb. L. Bul. 275.6
°Supra n. 44.61Case (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 164.62Supra n. 45.
63Cf. Corwin, The Full Faith and Credit Clause, (1933) 81 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 371, 387: "The day may come when the Court will approach the
question of the relation of the 'full faith and credit' clause to the extra-
state operation of laws from the same angle as it today views the broader
question of the scope of state legislative power. When and if that day
arrives, state statutes and judicial decisions will be given such extra-
territorial operation as seems reasonable to the Court to give them.
In short, the rule of the dominance of local policy of the forum state will
be superseded by that of judicial review."
